

JPRS 81687

1 September 1982

USSR Report

WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No. 5, May 1982

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

1 September 1982

USSR REPORT
WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No. 5, May 1982

Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

Contents of 'MEMO,' No 5, May 1982	1
English Summaries of 'MEMO' Articles	3
Role of Developing Countries in World Politics Reviewed (Ye. Primakov)	6
Iran, Pakistan, Egypt: Islam Reacts To Modern World (I. Timofeyev)	23
Soviet Journal Reviews Book on Lenin Legacy (N. Kolikov)	37

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
No 5, May 1982

Russian title : MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE
OTNOSHENIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : Ya. S. Khavinson

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo Pravda

Place of Publication : Moscow

Date of Publication : May 1982

Signed to press : 21 April 1982

Copies : 31,000

COPYRIGHT : Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika
i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1982

CONTENTS OF 'MEMO,' No 5, May 1982

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 82
(signed to press 21 Apr 82) pp 1-2

[Articles published in this report are indicated with an asterisk (*)]

[Text] Contents

"Torchlight of Revolutionary Thought and Action".....	3
*"Newly Independent Countries in International Relations"--Ye. Primakov.....	14
"United Nations and Scientific and Technological Cooperation: Organizational Aspects"--S. Tsukanov and A. Miroshnichenko.....	30
"Complex Problems of Trade and Development"--P. Khvoynik.....	40
*"The Role of Islam in the Social and Political Life of the Orient"-- I. Timofeyev.....	51
"The Conservative Onslaught"--John K. Galbraith.....	65
Our Comments	
"The EEC in the Labyrinth of Reform"--Yu. Shishkov.....	78
Criticism of Bourgeois Theories	
"The Theory of Value: The Foundation of Economic Science"--K. Val'tukh.....	86
In the Academic Council of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences	
"The World Economic Crisis of 1980-1981".....	100
Our Foreign Correspondent	
"Some Aspects of Militarization in the FRG"--V. Fedorov.....	119
History and Journalism	
"Fascism Means War"--L. Istyagin.....	128

Surveys and Reports

"Problems of Construction Efficiency--the Investment Aspect"-- V. Kondrat'yev.....	134
---	-----

Scientific Life

"The Activities of Specialized Councils of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences"-- A. Ognev.....	139
--	-----

Books and Authors

*"The Pertinence of Lenin's Legacy"--I. Kolikov.....	143
"Natural Tendencies in World Socialism"--I. Dudinskiy.....	147
"Mexican Scholars Criticize Washington Policy"--N. Zaytsev.....	148
"In Search of a 'Balanced' Policy"--A. Zagorskiy.....	150
"American Institutionalism in Search of New Theories"--V. Zarin.....	152
"Plutocratic Domination"--G. Tsagolov.....	154
"Natural Resources and the Arms Race"--G. Gornostayev.....	155

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya",
1982

8588

CSO: 1816/8

ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF 'MEMO' ARTICLES

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 82
(signed to press 21 Apr 82) pp 158-159

[Text] The editorial "Torchlight of Revolutionary Thought and Action" commemorates the centenary of the first Russian translation of "The Communist Manifesto" by K. Marx and F. Engels--the outstanding policy-planning document of Marxism that accomplished a crucial turnabout in the social consciousness of mankind.

The Russian translation of "The Communist Manifesto" played an important role in the spread of Marxism in Russia, serving as a powerful incentive for combining scientific socialism with the working class movement which had brought the Great October Socialist Revolution to its victorious end.

K. Marx and F. Engels traced the main tendencies in the historical process and determined the essential laws of the future communist society. The actual development of the contemporary socialist world testifies to their brilliant foresight.

The main conclusion of "The Communist Manifesto," embodying its central idea, is fidelity to the principles of solidarity and internationalism and consistent struggle for the unity and solidarity of the international working class. This struggle is a particularly important task of today's revolutionary and liberation movements. The ideas of "The Communist Manifesto" have passed the test of time and have proved their vitality in the new era, remaining the guiding star for today's Marxist-Leninists and for all who struggle for peace, democracy and social progress.

In his article "The Newly Independent Countries in International Relations," academician Ye. M. Primakov examines the process by which the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America evolved from an object into the active subject of international relations, the ways in which the developing countries affect the world political situation and their interest in the present world situation. The author analyzes the stages and components of the world system of international relations and reveals the nature of involvement and the specific role of the developing countries in this system as a result of the change in the correlation of forces between world socialism and world capitalism. The article examines in detail the place of the developing countries in the clashes and cooperation of the two opposing systems and in the policies of the USSR and United States. The article exposes the causes of destructive processes, namely the U.S.-inspired arms race and interstate regional conflicts, which have an extremely negative effect on the position

of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the world. The article also considers the non-alignment movement as an important factor in world politics, in which the constructive and complex role of the developing countries in the international arena has been manifested.

S. Tsukanov and A. Miroshnichenko analyze UN activity in the field of international scientific and technological cooperation in their article "The United Nations and Scientific and Technological Cooperation: Organizational Aspects." Special emphasis is laid on the problems connected with the improvement of the workings of various UN agencies and organizations engaged in scientific and technological research and the incorporation of their achievements in economic development. The authors discuss the basic stages of UN organizational forms of activity in science and technology and analyze some of the trends in their development. The positions of different groups of UN countries on the important political and economic issue of scientific and technological cooperation are discussed at length. In this connection, the role of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the efforts to strengthen UN activity in science and technology and to constantly channel this activity for peaceful and economic development is discussed in detail. The UN conference on science and technology for development, held in Vienna (Austria) in 1979, represented an important stage in UN activity. The authors analyze the results of the conference in detail and cite specific examples to demonstrate the great contribution made by the USSR and other socialist countries. The UN efforts to implement Vienna conference recommendations and the initial results of this work are discussed at length. With a view to these results, the authors review prospects for the improvement of UN participation in international scientific and technological cooperation.

P. Khvoynik analyzes the UNCTAD Secretariat 1981 report on trade and development in his article "Complex Problems of Trade and Development." This extremely interesting publication has aroused attention because of its contents and because it is the first of a series of annual reports and is therefore a largely experimental document. One of the report's salient features is its comprehensive examination of current economic issues and questions of long-range development. This points up complex analytical problems that are not present when these two matters are examined separately. The report reveals many of the causes of various economic difficulties in the developing countries, stating that the responsibility for the situation rests mainly with the industrialized Western powers because the level of economic activity in the countries with a developed market economy is still the single most important factor determining the export earnings of developing countries. The analysis indicates the negative consequences of the activities of transnational monopolies and of the protectionist policy of the developed capitalist countries. The author raises some questions about the methodology of the report and certain of its conclusions. In general, the author's evaluation of UNCTAD's latest report is positive. He regards it as evidence of this organization's great potential for the further improvement of research in the field of trade and development.

In his article "The Role of Islam in the Social and Political Life of the Orient," I. Timofeyev says that in the search for means of overcoming the acute problems generated by the contradictions of capitalist economic "modernization," different classes and social strata in some Muslim countries resort to religion in an attempt to work out an original course of development based on traditional spiritual values.

At the same time, slogans which are identical in form often have different social meanings, determined by the interests of various classes. What is the real nature of the Islamic movement? This is the focal point of modern Islamic studies. Only this kind of methodological approach can result in the objective evaluation of various trends in modern Islam and an understanding of the kaleidoscope of events occurring in the Middle East, Southeast and Southwest Asia and the African states. Citing numerous facts and figures, the author analyzes the political programs and actions of radical Islamic groups and parties in such countries as Iran, Pakistan and Egypt. He exposes the complicated and contradictory nature of the Muslim movement, in which progressive anti-imperialist and antifeudal trends are often combined with extreme reaction, anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. The author describes the ideological and political attitudes of the religious Iranian leadership and the "Jamaat-i-islami" party in Pakistan, as well as the ideas and actions of radical groups in Egypt, formed along the lines of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

The article "The Conservative Onslaught" in THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (22 January 1981) by John K. Galbraith, one of the leading representatives of the liberal wing of bourgeois political science, is interesting because the author criticizes the conventional brand of conservatism that has recently gained growing acceptance among monetarists and has influenced government policy in the United States and Great Britain.

In his discussion of postwar developments in the main capitalist countries, J. K. Galbraith notes that existing discrepancies and frequent contradictions have not kept the government, corporations and trade unions from reaching a compromise--or, in Galbraith's terms, a consensus--on a broad range of economic and social policies. This consensus is generally based on macroeconomic management and the implementation of certain social welfare programs to ease social tension.

The author's investigation testifies that the conservative attacks on government intervention in the economy have not affected the essence of state regulation, which serves the selfish interests of monopolies. The massive campaign for the re-establishment of the primacy of the market and the restoration of free competition has been a cover for an attack on working class interests and the achievements of the working class struggle.

Revealing the inconsistency of the monetarists' attempts to return to the era of free competition, J. K. Galbraith conveys doubt in the government's ability to cope with disorders in the capitalist economy by means of regulation. He proposes the combination of the free play of market forces with moderate government regulation in the particular spheres where the market does not work. Therefore, the traditional consensus should not be rejected, but simply adjusted to fit new conditions.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1982

8588

CSO: 1816/8

ROLE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD POLITICS REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 82
(signed to press 21 Apr 82) pp 14-29

[Article by Academician Ye. Primakov: "The Newly Independent Countries in International Relations"]

[Text] "The period of the East's awakening in the present revolution will be followed by a period during which all of the peoples of the East will take part in deciding the fate of the entire world so as to stop being only an object of enrichment. The peoples of the East are awakening to the realization that they must take action and that each people must take part in deciding the fate of all mankind."¹ V. I. Lenin's brilliant prediction is becoming a historical reality.

The transformation of the former colonies and semicolonies from primarily the object of history into active subjects has been accomplished mainly through structural changes in world economics.² During the present stage of historical development, however, changes in world politics and international relations are perhaps even more important. In any case, the consequences of this transformation were manifested much more quickly and on a much greater scale in this area, particularly when the political liberation of the colonies and semicolonies was followed by a lengthy, persistent and far from finished struggle for economic independence.

The transformation of the former colonies and semicolonies into an active subject of international relations occurred, first of all, when the liberated countries began to play an independent role in the world arena and, secondly, when their views began to be given increasing consideration in global decisionmaking.

What position do the developing countries actually occupy in the present system of international relations, including relations between the states of the two systems--socialist and capitalist? What are the main guidelines of the activity of the developing states and what kind of influence have they had on the world situation? Answers to these questions will require an examination of specifically political and methodological aspects of the position and role of the liberated countries in world politics.

The Newly Independent Countries in the System of International Relations

V. I. Lenin stressed that "people live within a state, and each state lives within a system of states, which are within a system of political balance in relation to

one mother."³ History has proved that this balance can be more or less stable at different times and more or less vulnerable to disruption. This naturally gives it a relative character. At the same time, it never remains static and does not presuppose the preservation of the social status quo in the world.

The establishment of the Asian, African and Latin American countries as part of the worldwide system of international relations was directly connected with the development of capitalism. Prior to the formation of the world capitalist economy, international relations were not of a truly global nature: In the political sphere they took the form of bilateral, and sometimes multilateral, ties, sporadically taking shape between states primarily in the form of military alliances, and in the economic sphere they took the form of irregular commercial exchanges. Neither in terms of their scales nor in terms of the intensity of their development could these relations be regarded as a system evolving according to its own peculiar laws.

The mechanism by which the worldwide system of international relations took shape determined the nature of the involvement of Asian, African and Latin American countries in this system and the specific position occupied by these countries in the system. This system, which was formed when the transition to capitalism acquired worldwide scales, consisted primarily of elements representing "vertical" complexes--the capitalist mother countries and their colonial and semicolonial possessions. The transition to the highest stage of capitalism marked the completion of the formation of what were now imperialist colonial complexes, with natural changes in the relative importance of some of them. The chief characteristic of this system of international relations was the prevalence of conflicts between capitalist states and, after the late 19th and early 20th centuries, between imperialist states. The opposition to their policy by the peoples of the colonies and dependent countries could not compare at that time in terms of strength or scales to the inter-imperialist conflicts which eventually caused a world war.

The struggle between the imperialist powers did not transcend the framework of the capitalist method of production. It was a distinctive feature of capitalism and of its imperialist stage. Nevertheless, the increasing intensity of inter-imperialist conflicts created an international situation which helped to break the chain of colonial dominion.

The changes in the position and role of the Asian, African and Latin American countries in the international arena were not a result of the evolution of the global system of international relations in which they were originally included, but a result of its transformation and its replacement with a new system of international relations, engendered by the creation of the world's first socialist state as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. When the two opposing social systems began to interact, the structure of a new system of international relations began to be influenced by the dominant methods of production in these two social systems and the peculiarities of their sociopolitical structure. Although the colonies and semicolonies remained within the capitalist part of the system of international relations for a long time, the colonial ties that bound these countries to the mother countries began to lose their political strength after the triumph of Great October. The development of the national liberation movement reached a turning point. As a result of the constantly changing balance of power between the capitalist and socialist worlds, the transformation of the newly

independent countries from objects to subjects of international relations began, in accordance with Lenin's well-known definition.⁴ This process correlated with the changing balance of power between the two systems in the world arena. It is obviously important to stress that the change in the balance of power passed through several stages, during each of which the weight of political, economic, military and other factors differed.⁵

The original balance between the two systems, which took shape after the victory of the October Revolution in Russia, was essentially based only on the political factor. At that time, socialism's only serious political advantages over capitalism stemmed from its progressive method of production and new order. In all other aspects, both in terms of basic economic indicators and in terms of the quantity and quality of weapons, the capitalist world far surpassed the first socialist state. Nevertheless, imperialism was unable to liquidate the Soviet regime in Russia, although it attempted direct military intervention against the worker and peasant state.

The political factor lying at the basis of the original balance between socialism and capitalism was reflected in an entire series of processes and phenomena. It was reflected in the unprecedented surge of revolutionary enthusiasm in Russia and the internal strength of the new regime, which mobilized and utilized the colossal historical resources and capabilities of the Russian people as no other order had been able to do. Inter-imperialist conflicts played a special role at this time, making it difficult for the imperialist powers to unite their efforts in the struggle against the new socialist state.

The political balance between socialism and capitalism was enough to have a positive effect on the ability of colonies and semicolonies to fight for their liberation. Soviet Russia established fundamentally new and equal relations with the countries of the East. Capitalism began to lose strength--even if this was not yet completely apparent--and entered the stage of general crisis.

The changing balance of power between socialism and capitalism entered a new stage after World War II and the creation of the world socialist system. Revolutionary advances in the countries of Eastern Europe resulted in the formation of the world socialist community. The common class interests of laborers in the fraternal countries acquired an intergovernmental basis. The socialist states displayed a high degree of unity and solidarity by uniting in the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). This was accompanied by the expansion of the economic and geographic basis on which socialism's advantages could be displayed more fully, particularly in the growth rate of productive forces.

Evidently, from that time on the balance of power between the two systems began to be based on military and economic factors, and not just political ones. This made the balance more stable and simultaneously afforded extensive possibilities for a more active role for the "peripheral" countries in the international arena. The most favorable conditions for the triumph of the national liberation struggle were established. As a result, imperialism's colonial system quickly disintegrated and several young sovereign states rose out of its ruins.

The collapse of the colonial system also had a significant effect on the balance of power between the socialist and capitalist worlds. After the colonial and

dependent countries acquired state sovereignty, they ceased to be imperialism's reserve. This applies to the former colonies and semicolonies which immediately embarked on the construction of socialism or adopted a socialist orientation and to the ones where the development of capitalism as the leading economic structure began or continued after the establishment of political independence.

In reference to the first group of countries this conclusion is absolutely self-evident, but in reference to the second it requires some clarification. It would seem that the development of capitalism in the former colonies and semicolonies would strengthen the capitalist world by expanding its geographic framework. But this would only have happened if the conflicts between the young states taking the capitalist course and the imperialist states did not transcend the framework of the usual or "traditional" conflicts between various capitalist countries or groups of countries. What actually happened was that the development of several former colonial and semicolonial countries according to capitalist patterns did not divest their policy of its anti-imperialist purpose, or at least its anti-imperialist tendencies. The existence of these tendencies in India's policy is a characteristic example.

The establishment of the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States, which Washington had to acknowledge in the 1970's, was particularly important with regard to the entire system of international relations and, of course, with regard to the changing position of the developing countries within this system. There was a real opportunity to transfer to a policy of international detente and establish the principles of peaceful coexistence by states of the two socioeconomic systems as the main guideline for world affairs in general.

For the newly independent countries this was of fundamental significance because it gave them much more opportunity, in comparison to the period of fierce bloc confrontation, to participate in world affairs, in the resolution of global problems and in deciding the fate of the world. International detente also set up tangible obstacles to block the forces that had tried to take advantage of the situation of general tension to export counterrevolution to the liberated countries. Finally, detente also promoted tendencies and processes aiding in the growth of the economic potential of the developing countries, the improvement of their position in the system of world economic ties and, as a result, the augmentation of their role in international relations.

Experience has proved without a doubt that peaceful coexistence does not impede the course of social processes in any way whatsoever because the development of society, presupposing cardinal socioeconomic and political changes, is historically determined.

The formation of the socialist community of states after World War II and the collapse of the colonial and semicolonial regimes led to extremely important structural changes in the system of international relations that benefited the liberated countries. The former colonies and semicolonies established broader and stronger ties with the socialist states and this was reflected in various spheres of international life. There were changes in the relations between the developed capitalist countries and their former colonial and semicolonial possessions that had embarked on independent governmental development. The liberated countries formed a new subsystem in the structure of international relations.

The worldwide struggle between socialism and capitalism has always affected all facets of international life. The main conflict of our era--the conflict between socialism and capitalism--ultimately determines the basic processes occurring in the newly independent countries.

There was absolutely no validity to the ideas and concepts of the ultra-leftist theorists who asserted that the focal point of world conflicts would move after World War II to the sphere of relations between imperialism and the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as to the relations between imperialist states. Obviously, it is true that conflicts between imperialism and national liberation forces and conflicts within the imperialist camp became more intense and pervasive after World War II, but this certainly provides no grounds for the conclusion that the focal point of world conflicts during the era of the global transition from capitalism to socialism would supposedly have no connection with the existence and struggle of the world socialist system--the main achievement of the international working class. In the first place, this assertion completely ignores the fact that the growth of the national liberation movements and their successful anti-imperialist struggle would be simply inconceivable without the overall change in the balance of power between the two opposing sociopolitical systems in favor of socialism and to the detriment of capitalism, or without the direct and indirect support of these national liberation movements by the socialist states. Secondly, this is a onesided interpretation of the situation in the capitalist world. Of course, inter-imperialist conflicts are still a significant factor: Their exacerbation, at the basis of which lies the law of uneven development under capitalism, has created clashes between capitalist countries. The international relations within the capitalist part of the system, however, are affected by more than just this disuniting tendency toward conflict; they are also affected by a second tendency--the tendency to unite all of the resources and potential of the capitalist countries, and primarily for a struggle against the socialist world. "The growing general crisis of capitalism has been accompanied by changes in imperialism's strategic priorities in the world arena. The policy of imperialism has been determined more and more by the class goals of a common struggle against the socialist world, national liberation revolutions and the workers movement."⁶

Disregard for the class features of the main conflict of our era led Mao Zedong and his followers to an anti-Marxist interpretation of the structure of international relations. According to this interpretation, one component supposedly consists of the "two superpowers"--The USSR and United States, the second consists of all other developed countries (both socialist and capitalist) and the third consists of all developing countries (including some socialist states). This concept differs little or not at all from the theories and models proposed by many bourgeois researchers. As a rule, their models of various systems of international relations also ignore the socioeconomic characteristics of the states interacting in the world arena.

This applies completely to the Western theories about the "bipolar" and "multipolar" worlds. The authors of these theories used the existence (including various forms of confrontation and cooperation) of two economically and militarily strong powers--the Soviet Union and the United States--as grounds for declaring that the world was bipolar, and strictly in terms of national governments. Furthermore, the "bipolarity" on the level of government is secondary and only reflects the division of today's world into two opposing sociopolitical systems.

the phenomenon of polycentrism is presented in much the same way. It is true that the presence of various "power centers" was much more apparent during the late 1960's and the 1970's than before in the capitalist subsystem of international relations. This was one of the effects of the law of uneven development under capitalism. Whereas the U.S. industrial product in 1950 was more than twice as great as the combined products of Western Europe and Japan, by the beginning of the 1970's the U.S. share of capitalist industrial production had fallen to 28.8 percent and the share of Western Europe and Japan had risen to 47.1 percent.⁷ The growing economic potential of the latter was not, however, accompanied by the loss of the United States' dominant position in the military-political sphere, which allowed it to remain the leader in the capitalist subsystem of international relations. As a result of its approaches to fundamental issues on the other capital-

ist states, the tendency toward polycentrism in the capitalist world creates opportunities for the developing countries to take political action in defense of their own national interests. This conclusion is also corroborated by the fact that the tendency was reflected in the creation of "mini-centers of power" in the capitalist world, something like "sub-imperialist centers." Many of these have been turned into support points of imperialist policy but retained their independence from the developed capitalist states.

The formation of a "political center" in the system of international relations during the 1960's and 1970's in the West in connection with the clearly hegemonic role in China's foreign policy. The formation of the "Chinese center" was the result of the supposedly universal law of polycentrism. The departure of Maoist China from the general line of the socialist community was not a result of the natural development of the world socialist system, however, but of a subjective factor--the policy of the Beijing leadership which was incongruous with the objective requirements of the development of the world socialist system and the world revolutionary process. In China there was an obvious contradiction between objective processes stemming from public ownership of the means of production and the voluntaristic, adventuristic and hegemonistic line of the country's leadership. This contradiction could have led to the degeneration of the sociopolitical structure or to the disintegration of the line which did not agree with the objective needs of socialist development in China.

It is quite understandable that the PRC's global strategy and its alliance with imperialism are contrary to the fundamental interests of the struggle against imperialism and therefore weaken the position of the newly independent countries. Besides this, Beijing's line is reinforcing the tendency toward the proliferation of conflicts in the East.

The Newly Independent Countries in the Context of Relations Between the Two Systems

The process by which the countries that freed themselves from colonial and semi-colonial dependence became an active subject of international relations took place in an atmosphere of complicated relations between the two sociopolitical systems in the international arena. The liberated states were certainly not isolated from these interrelations. On the one hand, the conflicts--and also the development of cooperation in some areas after the process of detente began--between states of the

two world systems were directly and indirectly connected with the role and place of the newly independent countries in the international arena. On the other hand, these countries have also taken a more active stand on several cardinal issues in recent years and have been able to influence relations between states of the two systems, which has been particularly apparent in the growing significance of the movement for non-alignment in world politics. As a result, the position of the developing states in the system of international relations has been affected by contradictory processes: Some aspects of relations between states of the two systems reinforce the position of the developing countries; others, which are the result of imperialism's aggressive foreign policy, can have a negative effect on their position. It seems that two destructive processes have the most negative effect on their position--the first is the unprecedented arms race which has been instigated by American imperialists and has created the danger of thermonuclear war, and the second is the group of intergovernmental regional conflicts which can grow into global armed confrontations.

At the turn of the decade the United States began to undermine international detente. It escalated the arms race. The tendency toward militarization has become distinct in U.S. policy. All of this has also affected Washington's approach to conflicts, which is governed by the military-political views of the most reactionary circles in the nation and often serve as a direct means of expanding American military presence in the conflict zone.

We could say that Washington has completely "recovered" from the "Vietnam syndrome" under the Reagan Administration. The following concepts have "acquired the rights of citizenship" in the U.S. capital: "Containment" on the global level is not enough to safeguard U.S. national interests; the range of instruments that might be used by the United States must include "limited nuclear war"; it will be necessary to create the potential to fight two or two and a half wars simultaneously, including "total war" in the Near and Middle East (this is the military doctrine announced by Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger).

The Reagan Administration counted on more intense confrontation with the Soviet Union simultaneously on the global and the regional levels. The tougher American line also reflected the desire of the country's most reactionary circles to stop changes that were undesirable for Washington in the sociopolitical development of the Asian, African and Latin American countries by moving away from the process of detente.

The U.S. line of creating anti-Soviet coalitions as a supplement to NATO was also developed further. The policy of rapprochement with China, particularly by means of the cancellation of restrictions on sales of American weapons to this country, occupied a special place in this plan. Increasingly overt moves have been made for the purpose of using Japan in confrontation with the USSR, and several American politicians have openly proposed the creation of an anti-Soviet "triangle" consisting of the United States, Japan and China.

The normalization of Washington's relations with Beijing, which began in Nixon's time and was continued by subsequent administrations, was obviously supposed to serve American military-political interests. It was no coincidence that this gave the United States a chance to strengthen its military presence in Asia.

The Reagan Administration escalated the arms race, including the production of neutron and chemical weapons and "cruise missiles" and the improvement of all nuclear weapon delivery systems. Special attention began to be paid to conventional weapons for the purpose of equipping the forces intended for rapid deployment in various conflict situations. At the same time, U.S. officials began to discuss a new version of the strategy of "flexible response" with which the Pentagon had armed itself in the beginning of the 1960's. It presupposed, as is well known, multiple-level confrontation with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization--from negotiations from a "position of strength" to the approach to the "critical threshold," beyond which thermonuclear world war lay. It would probably be wrong, however, to assume that the present discussion proposes a simple return to the earlier doctrine. In the beginning of the 1960's there was no international detente as such, and the strategic parity between the Soviet Union and United States was just taking shape. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, or in the last years of Carter's term in office and the first years of the Reagan Administration, the United States returned to a policy of military-political intervention in regional conflicts, the reinforcement of military presence in various parts of the world, accompanied by a departure from the policy of detente on the global level, and attempts to disrupt the military-strategic balance with the Soviet Union. This caused the dangers inherent in American foreign policy to grow immeasurably. Sufficient proof of this can be found just in the statements of American strategists about the alleged possibility of winning a "limited" nuclear war.

American Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger called the new American strategy a strategy of "direct confrontation" with the USSR, stressing that it should be implemented simultaneously on the global and regional scales. This strategy, which came to light during the new round of the arms race and the new stage of relations with the USSR, places special emphasis on more active American policy in various parts of the world. The United States is assigning priority to permanent military presence in certain zones and the creation of the necessary local conditions for the rapid deployment of American military contingents.

The connection between the modification of American military strategy and the evolution of the attitude toward international conflicts has been clearly illustrated in Washington's approach to the Near East and Persian Gulf zone. It has declared this entire region a "third strategic zone," with Europe and the Pacific representing the other two. In the expectation of open intervention, the United States announced its plan to create special intervention forces in this zone, consisting of three army divisions, four air regiments with 72 planes in each, two carrier forces and 50,000 Marines.⁸ In the beginning of the 1980's Washington tried to acquire bases in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Egypt for the local deployment of these forces and to provide the U.S. Navy with the necessary facilities. There was an increase in American military aid not only to Israel, but also to several conservative Arab regimes. In connection with the Camp David bargain, the United States first gained an opportunity for permanent military presence in this region, with its armed services serving as the backbone of the so-called "multinational force" that was supposed to patrol the Egyptian-Israeli border in Sinai.

A new military emphasis also appeared in U.S. policy on the settlement of the Middle East conflict. Israel's rapprochement with conservative Arab regimes became the main goal. For this purpose, American politicians resolved to create a situation in the Middle East that would be "neither full-scale war nor a general peace."

Therefore, even U.S. strategic concepts, which are based on the arms race, are contributing to the artificial exacerbation of intergovernmental regional conflicts. There is also a reciprocal connection: The conflict situations, which are often stimulated or even created by the United States on the regional level, escalate the arms race.

The real prospect of the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons obviously deserves special consideration in this connection. Under these conditions, the struggle for the immediate institution of the strictest measures on the national and international levels to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, heighten its impact and broaden the group of its signatories to the maximum has become even more important. Now that nuclear power engineering is being developed so intensely, there is an urgent need for the system of control envisaged in this treaty to prevent fissionable materials from being moved out of the civilian sphere to the sphere of nuclear arms production. Countries capable of producing nuclear weapons in secret, such as Israel, which refused to have its reactors inspected by the IAEA,⁹ are taking advantage of the absence of the necessary control. The United States is indirectly encouraging this stand by exempting Israel (and, in the beginning of the 1980's, Pakistan) from the U.S. laws prohibiting the offer of aid to countries which refuse to abide by the international regulations preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

As for the USSR, it has always realized the need for equitable political settlements of international conflicts. The Soviet Union's categorical opposition to the export of revolution was reaffirmed at the 26th CPSU Congress. V. I. Lenin repeatedly stressed that a revolution cannot be victorious in any country without the proper internal conditions.¹⁰ The Soviet Union is also resolutely opposed to the export of counterrevolution, believing that all people have the right to decide their own fate, the right of self-determination, and that external forces must not interfere in this process.

The Soviet Union is known to support the limitation, and later the cessation, of the arms race between the USSR and United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. In other words, it is primarily in favor of the stabilization of affairs on the global level. There is no question that regional initiatives can also serve the cause of peace and security.

The institution of confidence-building measures in Asia, especially the Far East, as L. I. Brezhnev said in the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th party congress, could be an important step in this direction. These measures can be instituted collectively by all interested sides (in the form of, for example, a convention on mutual non-aggression and the refusal to use force in relations between the Asian and Pacific states) and on the bilateral basis.

The measures proposed by the Soviet Union could include action to reinforce the stability of the military-political situation, to reduce and then eliminate military confrontation between various states and to alleviate suspicions about their military activity.

The confidence-building measures could take in specific concerted actions (not only Soviet-American, of course, although they could play an extremely important role)

in such areas as the prevention of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the prevention of armed conflicts; the renunciation of attempts at the unilateral "management" of conflict situations in favor of coordinated actions for their regulation; the institution of an entire group of procedures for the advance announcement of combat maneuvers, training exercises and troop movements, the exchange of military observers and delegations and the reduction of the scales of maneuvers and exercises; agreements to turn some regions--already or potentially dangerous ones--into zones of peace, etc.

All of this would certainly be promoted by the normalization of relations between the three countries of Indochina and the five ASEAN countries. It could be reinforced with bilateral agreements on the peaceful coexistence of the countries of Indochina with the PRC and a system of international safeguards with the participation of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This would not exclude the possibility of a general treaty on peace and stability in this region.

An agreement on the neutralization of several regions where armed forces and arms are being built up would be of great significance. Some of these regions are the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean zones.

As we know, Soviet-American talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean were conducted in 1977-1978. Unfortunately, it was precisely at the time when real progress in these talks was apparent, in February 1978, that the U.S. Government refused to continue them and began the large-scale buildup of its military presence and military activity in the Indian Ocean.

As for the Persian Gulf zone, the measures proposed by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech in New Delhi on 10 December 1980 include the following mutual obligations:

Not to establish foreign military bases in the Persian Gulf or on adjacent islands; not to deploy nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction there;

Not to use force or threaten the use of force against Persian Gulf countries and not to interfere in their internal affairs;

To respect the non-aligned status chosen by Persian Gulf states; not to involve them in military groups with nuclear powers among their members;

To respect the sovereign right of states in this region to their own natural resources;

Not to pose any dangers or threats to normal commercial exchange and the use of the shipping lanes connecting the states of this region with other countries.¹¹ The Soviet Union proposed that this kind of agreement be concluded not only on the Soviet-American level, but also with the full participation of the states of this region, China, Japan, the Western European countries and all states displaying an interest in this.

It is known that the Soviet Union made concessions to the West by agreeing to discuss all of these measures along with questions connected with Afghanistan.

Even this constructive line, however, did not evoke a positive response from the Western powers.

As the Soviet side has repeatedly stressed, the question of military detente in the Mediterranean could also be discussed. This would envisage the coordinated reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons, the refusal to deploy nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean non-nuclear countries and the adoption of commitments by the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country that has not permitted the emplacement of such weapons within its territory.

The mutual limitation of naval actions by the USSR and United States, proposed by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the 17th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, the extension of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, particularly the regions of the most lively shipping, and, in general, all signs of maximum restraint on the part of both opposing blocs of states in their military activity could have a considerable positive effect on the world situation as a whole, including the position of the liberated countries.

Of course, the successful implementation of these measures, or even of some of them, would tend to stabilize the situation in various parts of the world.

It is clear that the policy line of the USSR and its political and diplomatic activity are of great significance for the liberated countries. Whereas imperialism's line is impeding their establishment as an active factor in the development of international relations, the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has created and is creating the fundamental conditions required for a more active role by the liberated states in the international arena.

Non-Alignment--A Policy of Positive Influence in International Relations

The role of the liberated countries in international relations has been most clearly reflected in the policy of non-alignment pursued by the overwhelming majority of these countries. The history of its origins and development has been discussed in sufficient detail in works by Soviet and foreign authors. Here we will simply try to examine the essence of this phenomenon and its role and place in contemporary international relations, as well as some of the contradictory aspects of the actual meaning with which the policy of non-alignment has been invested by various states belonging to this movement.

The former colonial and semicolonial countries entered a world which was divided not only into opposite socioeconomic systems but also into opposing military blocs--NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Whereas the sociopolitical sphere afforded the young states an opportunity to advance toward socialism without going through a capitalist stage (during the course of an either socialist or national democratic revolution), this did not mean their automatic inclusion in the Warsaw Pact. In exactly the same way, when liberated countries chose the capitalist path of development, it did not mean that they had consented to participate in NATO or in military alliances related to this bloc, such as SEATO and CENTO.

In this complex situation the developing countries began to seek their own path for the purpose of making a constructive contribution to international affairs,

creating a favorable external atmosphere for the reinforcement and defense of the national sovereignty they had won after an arduous struggle, developing their productive forces, raising the standard of living and guaranteeing their progress. This is how the policy of non-alignment was born. What are its basic features?

Above all, struggle for the prevention of war, against the power tactics used by imperialist states and for a solid and just peace objectively became the main purpose of the movement for non-alignment at the time of its birth. This was not an abstract, humanitarian type of goal. For the liberated countries it was dictated by their immediate vital interests.

The former colonies and semicolonies entered a world in which qualitatively new weapons of mass destruction had already been developed and could endanger the very existence of civilization. Another facet of the international situation in which the liberated countries found themselves was their tendency to serve as the object of the military-strategic lust of imperialism even when there is no full-scale war but there is tension and military confrontation.

The implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, which envisage, in particular, the coordinated efforts of states of both systems to solve global problems, became necessary to the Asian, African and Latin American countries primarily as a way of solving their socioeconomic problems. Within this context, the question of freeing the funds spent by the great powers on military needs, with the prospect of using part of them for the economic development of the former colonies and semicolonies, acquired colossal importance.¹² It is no coincidence that the developing countries associate arms limitation with the hope of acquiring more financial, economic, scientific and technical outside assistance. Disarmament would not only make tremendous sums available, but would also considerably augment civilian scientific and technical potential by rechanneling military research and development into peaceful areas.

The prospect of curbing and then stopping the arms race is also extremely important to the liberated countries because it could stop all of the "mini-races" that are keeping colossal sums from being invested in the economy. As the weaker side in international division of labor, the developing countries bear a disproportionately large share of the burden of worldwide military expenditures. Between 1965 and 1980, or precisely at the time when the liberated countries began to play a more noticeable and more active role in international affairs, their share of world arms expenditures rose, according to SIPRI data, from 6.3 percent¹³ to 16 percent.¹⁴ Furthermore, in the 1970's the military expenditures of the Asian, African and Latin American countries grew more quickly than their GNP. The figures for some regions are particularly amazing. In 1977 per capita military expenditures in the Middle East were 250 dollars, which is equivalent to the indicator for the developed capitalist countries.¹⁵

Huge amounts of currency, which could be invested in the economy or the purchase of the advanced technology that is so necessary to the developing countries, are being spent unproductively on weapons. According to UNCTAD calculations, the liberated countries were spending 9 billion dollars a year on the acquisition of patents and licenses at the end of the 1970's. At the same time, they were spending more than 60 billion dollars a year on military preparations,¹⁶ or a sum seven times as great

at the cost of imported technology. Furthermore, the creation of a national military industry in the developing countries has had a negligible effect on their scientific, technical and economic progress in general.

This refutes the currently popular "theory" that the military industry can supposedly stimulate many of the civilian projects that are necessary to the developing countries.

Another facet of the problem is the effect of the arms race on the shortage of skilled personnel in the developing countries. In many cases, the personnel with the best training have been moved from the civilian sphere to the military industry, and at a time of an acute shortage of qualified personnel. In view of the fact that the total number of persons employed in the production sphere is only a few times greater than the number of armed forces (for example, there were slightly more than 1.5 million workers employed in industry and construction in Turkey at the end of the 1970's, while the Turkish Army numbered 500,000),¹⁷ this kind of diversion of human resources has a pernicious effect on economic growth rates.

Of course, some of the military expenditures of the liberated countries are valid. In many cases they are dictated by a real threat to the security of these countries. It should simply be borne in mind that the arms race on the global level is, on the one hand, objectively helping to strengthen the threat posed by imperialist circles and their actual allies and, on the other, providing much of the inspiration for the "mini-races" in the developing world, which are being conducted for reasons having nothing to do with the security interests of the liberated countries.

The establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence as the norm in international life could make it easier for the liberated countries to assume their new role in world economic ties. Problems in the development of the economic, scientific and technical potential of the liberated countries and in the transfer of technological experience to them are relegated to a position of secondary importance in a cold war atmosphere.¹⁸ The overall improvement of the international climate, on the other hand, promotes the widespread discussion of objectively necessary changes in the conditions of trade, economic, scientific and technical relations between the former colonies and the mother countries.

In 1973-1974 the developing countries challenged the existing system of trade and economic relations. At the fourth meeting of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries in Algeria in September 1973, a resolution on a new international economic order was adopted. Within a month, OPEC proved for the first time that the developing countries, which control most of the major types of raw materials, possess a strong means of exerting economic pressure on the developed capitalist states. It was precisely under the conditions of detente that the UN General Assembly adopted the famous fundamental documents--the "Declaration" and "Program of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," the "Charter of Economic Rights and Obligations of States" and "Development and International Economic Cooperation"--at its sixth and seventh special sessions and its 29th regular session. They laid the foundations for a new system of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties between developed and developing states.

The deterioration of international affairs at the end of the 1970's, caused by Washington's aggressive foreign policy line, soon affected the attitude of the

United States and some other developed capitalist states toward the problem of economic ties with the developing countries. During the course of the talks on the reorganization of world economic ties, the developed capitalist countries took a noticeably tougher stand. It was already completely obvious at the Fifth UNCTAD Session in Manila, which was marked by the unconcealed opposition of the industrially developed capitalist countries to the adoption of resolutions which would advance the reorganization of international economic relations on a fair and democratic basis.

This was also the atmosphere of the 11th special session of the UN General Assembly on economic problems, convened at the initiative of the developing countries. The work of the summer 1979 Vienna session of the UN Conference on Science, Technology and Development (UNCSTAD) also aroused some public disillusionment. The October 1981 meeting of the heads of state and foreign ministers of 14 developing and 8 developed capitalist states in Cancun, where the reorganization of the rules of international economic exchange was discussed, also ended unproductively as a result of the obstructionist behavior of the United States.

The struggle at the turn of the decade to prevent a new cold war and continue detente was especially important to the developing countries. The dialectical interconnection and interdependence of the objectives of the struggle for peace and international security and the struggle for the national and social liberation of peoples was clearer than ever before under the conditions of that time.

In their efforts to attain these objectives, the liberated countries could not and did not preach amorphous pacifism--apparently, this is another important characteristic of their policy of non-alignment. The movement for non-alignment as a whole has always been aimed (of course, other tendencies have also been apparent, but they have not been dominant) not at amorphous pacifism but at the implementation of the positive and constructive principles of peaceful coexistence by states. This aim is also an objective reflection of the growing group of tasks facing the former colonies and semicolonies and connected with the struggle for economic independence, and no longer just with the survival and reinforcement of political sovereignty.

It is important to stress something else--from the very beginning the movement for non-alignment could not be neutral by virtue of the very nature of the problems facing most of the states in the movement, for which their material and political position in the world is a vitally important factor of internal development. It never did become neutral, although some tendencies toward neutralism have always been present in the movement.

From the very beginning non-alignment has been a policy of active struggle against forces encroaching upon the national interests of the liberated countries--the arms race, the preparations for global war, the series of local military operations aimed at depriving the liberated countries of their independence and the preservation of the international system of economic relations that leads to the exploitation of the developing world. Furthermore, the specific alignment of forces in the world objectively made the movement for non-alignment anti-imperialist from the very beginning. When the non-aligned states faced the real situation, they gave their policy, worked out on an individual and collective basis, an obviously anti-imperialist character.

Of course, not all of the states in the movement have occupied the same anti-imperialist stand. There are states which have consistently fought against all signs of imperialist aggression and there are countries which vacillate and take contradictory positions. Some developing countries have been guided by totally different considerations, particularly those which can be eloquently summed up in the curse: "A plague on both your houses." This kind of attitude gives birth to theories of "equidistance" from the USSR and the United States and the policy of transforming the movement for non-alignment into some kind of "third power" equally opposed to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Sometimes "equidistance" is justified by the liberated countries' desire for self-sufficiency and an independent role in international affairs. This self-sufficiency, however, does not actually come about as a result of equal "distance" from the socialist and capitalist worlds. It is no secret that the two worlds have taken opposite approaches to the movement for non-alignment. Whereas the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have treated this movement as an extremely positive and completely independent factor in international life, the United States and its allies have viewed it as an essentially negative phenomenon. This was most fully reflected in the description given to the policy of non-participation in military blocs in the 1950's by then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He called this policy "amoral." Later, when the movement acquired more prestige, potential and influence in international affairs, the leaders of the imperialist states refrained from making public statements of this kind. Nevertheless, the sharply negative attitude of imperialist reactionary forces toward the policy of non-alignment, toward the states in this movement and, in general, toward the prospect of a greater role for the liberated countries in world politics has repeatedly been confirmed by many Western propaganda and political moves.

It is important to stress something else: "Equidistance" conflicts with the objective interest of the liberated countries in an alliance with other anti-imperialist forces and, of course, with the leaders among these forces--the states of the socialist community.

Understandably, the question of the natural allies and enemies of the movement was influenced by the change in its membership. This occurred when a number of members (Vietnam, Cuba and others) chose the path of socialist development and others embarked on a socialist orientation. These countries are the main targets of the subversive activity of imperialist and reactionary forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and their active participation in the movement has certainly strengthened its anti-imperialist potential.

At the same time, processes of differentiation and diversification have become more pronounced in the developing world and so-called "sub-imperialist centers" have sprung up. This has also been reflected in the birth of some antidemocratic tendencies in the movement. They have not, however, prevailed over its primarily anti-imperialist purpose. Anti-imperialism could be called the past and present creed of this movement.

By means of struggle against imperialism and colonialism and against war and aggression, the former colonies and semicolonies have won political freedom and the recognition of their place in world politics and have realized that they are

an active and important factor of world development. The key to the further augmentation of the role of these countries in international relations and in the resolution of major problems in their internal development lies in the fidelity of the liberated states to the principles on which the movement for non-alignment is founded.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 328.
2. Ye. Primakov, "The Place of the Liberated Countries in the World Economy," *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA*, No 3, 1982.
3. V. I. Lenin, *Op. cit.*, vol 42, p 59.
4. *Ibid.*, vol 39, p 327.
5. The primary elements of the political factor are the breadth of the social base and the internal stability of various regimes, the ability of states to make effective use of human and economic resources (the so-called organizational ability of the state), real opportunities to make decisions, the morale of the population and its capacity for mobilization, the degree to which state policy is supported by the public and the nature of this support. The political factor also includes the resolution of ally problems on the governmental level and through the support given the policy of the state or group of states by broad segments of the world public. Other elements of the political factor are the ideological considerations connected with the attitudes of various population groups toward state policy, which influence the capabilities of the political system, and the power to mobilize support for this policy. The political factor is not only reflected directly, but also through its influence in the economic and military spheres, where it largely determines the speed of economic and military construction and the morale of the army and rear.

The economic factor of the balance of forces also operates on many levels. In particular, it largely determines the scales and content of the state's military potential. At the same time, the economic level and economic potential of a country have a direct effect on its role in world politics and its influence in international events. For example, the significance of Japan and the FRG in international affairs rose sharply in the 1960's and 1970's precisely as a result of their growing economic potential and capabilities.

The correlation of forces is reflected most directly and most "measurably" in the military factor. Over the long range, however, even technological breakthroughs in the military sphere cannot have a significant, prolonged effect on the balance of forces without the proper economic or political bases.

The influence of the military factor is now being limited by the existence of the dynamic balance (or parity) of the military-strategic capabilities of the United States and USSR and of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as by the

destructive potential of nuclear weapons, which has necessitated the reconsideration of goals and means in the area of international relations.

6. "Mezhdunarodnoye soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy" [International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties], Moscow, 1969, p 45.
7. "Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1979," vol II, N.Y., 1980, pp 3, 5, 7.
8. NEWSWEEK, 8 June 1981, p 15.
9. Besides this, Israel completely ignored the results of an IAEA inspection of a reactor located near the capital of Iraq, which proved that the reactor was being used for peaceful purposes, and launched an air raid on it in 1981.
10. See, for example, V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 36, pp 457, 531.
11. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following in Lenin's Footsteps], vol 8, Moscow, 1981, p 557.
12. According to the data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), world expenditures on weapons in 1980 reached 500 billion dollars and could rise to 820 billion dollars a year by 2000 if they continue to grow at the present rate. See "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1981" (referred to hereafter as "SIPRI"), Stockholm, 1981, pp 147, 150.
13. "SIPRI 1980," p XVIII.
14. "SIPRI 1981," p XIX.
15. "SIPRI 1979," pp 1-2.
16. Calculated according to: "SIPRI 1981," pp 156-158.
17. Calculated according to: "The Middle East Yearbook," London, 1979; "Yearbook of Labor Statistics," Geneva, 1980.
18. Everyone knows that science and technology play the key role in the acceleration of economic and sociocultural development. Everyone also knows that the level of scientific and technical potential is extremely low in the overwhelming majority of Asian, African and Latin American countries. Although these countries are inhabited by 70 percent of the world population, they accounted for only 4 percent of world expenditures on science and technology and 2 percent of world scientific and technical potential in the mid-1970's. The ratio of per capita research and experimental design in the developed capitalist countries to the same indicator in the developing countries was 140:1 during that period (calculated according to: "UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1980," Paris, 1980). It is obvious that the developing countries are not capable of closing this gap on their own. Access to the scientific and technical experience of the developed countries is an important factor stimulating their economic and sociocultural progress. This allows the Asian, African and Latin American countries to "skip" the intermediate stages in the development of productive forces that have already been undergone by highly developed countries.

IRAN, PAKISTAN, EGYPT: ISLAM REACTS TO MODERN WORLD

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 82
(signed to press 21 Apr 82) pp 51-63

[Article by I. Timofeyev: "The Role of Islam in the Sociopolitical Life of the Orient"]

[Text] In recent years increased activity by various movements for the revival of Islam has been witnessed in a number of liberated countries and there have been attempts to put Islamic principles and ideals into social and political practice and to create a special "Islamic state" and "Islamic economy." These processes have been manifested in their clearest and most acute forms in the countries where the capitalist modernization of the economy by means of a "synthesis" of traditional and bourgeois structures has been attempted for a number of years. This is no coincidence. The contradictions of the capitalist path of development, which is in the interest of the ruling elite and of local entrepreneurs linked with the Western monopolies, have exacerbated the social class struggle in these countries and have promoted the growth of political movements that often adopt the religious slogans most easily understood by the mass mind.

"In certain Eastern countries," L. I. Brezhnev has noted, "Islamic slogans have recently been advanced with great vigor. We communists respect the religious convictions of people who profess Islam and other religions. The important thing here is the aims pursued by the forces proclaiming particular slogans. A liberation struggle can develop under the banner of Islam. This has been demonstrated by history, including the most recent history. History also testifies that Islamic slogans are also used by reactionary forces stirring up counterrevolutionary rebellions. The actual content of the particular movement is consequently the point of the matter."

Therefore, the actual content of Islamic movements is the central issue in today's Islamic studies. It is only on this methodological basis that an objective assessment can be made of the various trends in modern Islam and an analysis can be conducted of the kaleidoscope of events in the Near East, Southwest and Southeast Asia and the African states.

The term "the Muslim world," which has been commonly used in political discussions in the last few years, requires some clarification. Geographically, the "Muslim

world" covers a huge territory--from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the easternmost tip of the Asian continent. Since no population census has ever been held in many Muslim countries, it is impossible to determine the number of devout Muslims with sufficient accuracy. It ranges between 500 and 800 million people, according to different calculations. The "Muslim world" is by no means monolithic from the standpoint of political structure and the orientation or level of socioeconomic development. It includes states that possess billions of petrodollars (for instance, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait) and states that are among the world's poorest countries. In terms of their state structure, the Muslim countries form a very broad spectrum with revolutionary democratic regimes at one end and feudal theocratic monarchies at the other. Some countries pursue a consistent anti-imperialist and anticolonialist policy and take an active part in the non-aligned movement and the struggle for peace and social progress, while others follow in the footsteps of the aggressive imperialist policy of the United States and other Western powers. There are also differences in the relative clout of Islamic ideology and in Islam's place in the state structure of particular countries. Islam is the official state religion in 28 countries. Muslims constitute the numerical majority in 35 countries and an influential minority in 18 others.

The "Muslim world" is also heterogeneous from the standpoint of religious doctrine: Contemporary Islam is represented by two main trends--Sunnism and Shi'ism--and each of these is broken down in turn into a number of sects and orders. Around 90 percent of the Muslims profess Sunnism, which is regarded as the orthodox trend in Islam, and the remaining 10 percent subscribe to Shi'ism. A political-religious contradiction, resulting from the fact that the majority of members of the community support one trend in Islam whereas the ruling elite subscribes to the other, is manifested in an extremely acute form in some countries (Bahrain, for example, where most of the population is Shi'ite but the power is in the hands of a Sunni dynasty).

The reasons for the present "politicization" of Islam and for its sharply increased influence on the minds and emotions of broad segments of the population in some countries of the foreign East have recently been the subject of animated discussion in scientific literature. These tendencies stem from a number of Islam's intrinsic features and from the specific political and sociocultural conditions in the regions where it is widespread.

Above all, it must be borne in mind that Islam is more than just a confessional system that includes religious philosophical dogma (iman) and ritual practice (din). Islam actually regulates every aspect of the life of community members--the standards of behavior in society, questions of family, marriage and inheritance, attitudes toward the outside world, etc. To a considerable extent, it also determines the social structure of society, legal precepts, economic relations, public morality and the consciousness of believers. In this sense, Islam can be regarded as a "way of life," shaped by religious dogma and hallowed by centuries of tradition.

After the conditions of colonial enslavement, when all power was effectively concentrated in the hands of infidels--the colonial administration, the occupying troops, foreign companies and missionaries--Islam was often the only means of consolidating national and patriotic forces and the only form of social consciousness. It is therefore natural that movements for national independence often assumed a religious form and were accompanied by the slogans of Islamic liberation and reformist movements.

It is a well-known fact that the development of capitalism in Europe was accompanied by the erosion of medieval traditions and the medieval tenor of life, by the decline of religion's influence and by the secularization of state and social institutions. The situation in the Muslim East was different. The formation of bourgeois relations, the involvement of these countries in world capitalist economics and their gradual introduction to the attributes of Western civilization were bound to undermine the traditional way of life. As a rule, however, "Westernization" had a profound effect only on the ruling exploitative elite, while the broad popular masses remained firmly committed to Islamic dogma.

The social base of Islam was made up of the peasantry, the semiproletariat and the lower strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie. Together, they accounted for over 90 percent of the population of the Muslim countries. Under these conditions, the national bourgeoisie, which headed the struggle for independence, generally wrapped its demands in religious trappings, which made its ideas intelligible to broad segments of the population.

This situation persists today in many respects. Anti-imperialist movements in a number of Muslim countries have essentially clothed themselves in religious garb and assumed the nature of a struggle for "the purity of Islam" and for the restoration of its supposedly inherent principles of social justice.

At the same time, Islamic slogans are adopted not only by anti-imperialist and anticolonial forces, but also by local reaction, which is linked to imperialism and neocolonialism by the strongest bonds. Taking advantage of the religious fervor and illiteracy of the broad masses, the exploiter classes seek to employ "Islamization" to strengthen their own dominance, divert the working people from the struggle for their rights and utilize believers against progressive and democratic forces.

II

The differences in the political orientation and social aims of various religious currents that put forward similar, and often identical, slogans demonstrate the heterogeneity of the Islamic movement and dictate the need for a differentiated approach toward these currents, for the determination of their class and social content and for the investigation of the specific situation in various countries. In spite of the active and, in some cases, leading role of the clergy in the anti-imperialist struggle, the socioeconomic programs it proposes, which are aimed at restoring patriarchal relations, most often assume the character of a petty bourgeois utopia.

The experience of Iran is quite indicative in this respect: The antimonarchic and anti-imperialist revolution there operated in religious guise and culminated in the formation of an "Islamic republic" that, to a certain extent but by no means entirely, implemented the ideas and principles of Shi'ite Islam. The despotically repressive nature of the shah's regime, the transformation of Iran into an economic, financial and military appendage of imperialism, its increasingly broad involvement in the system of neocolonial exploitation and the capitalist nature of socioeconomic development exacerbated the contradictions between the monarchy and its imperialist allies, on the one hand, and the popular masses, on

the other. These were, as the International research group of the journal PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA stressed, the main reasons for the antimonarchic explosion in February 1979.¹

Under the conditions of a military police state that brutally suppressed any manifestations of dissidence and banned the activities of political parties, the mosques were the only possible rostrums for the opposition, and various political forces in Iran grouped round these rostrums. Here it is necessary to consider the specific historical features of the Shi'ite trend in Islam, which predetermined, in many respects, the clergy's leading role in the events of 1978-1979. Although it had been the official religion of the majority of Iranians since the early 16th century, Imam-type Shi'ism, unlike Sunnism, had never been part of the state structure. As the creed of a persecuted minority from the very outset, Shi'ism had spent many centuries in opposition to the secular government, which seemed illegitimate to its adepts. Because of their "debarment" from state power, the Shi'ite hierarchs were more closely linked than the Sunni hierarchs with the community of believers, in whose eyes they were endowed with special divine grace (barakah). An ulema's ascent of the hierarchical ladder depended on the prestige he enjoyed in the community as a result of his piety, erudition in theological sciences and qualities of leadership. In other words, only the unanimous support of the faithful could provide sufficient grounds for a religious figure to acquire a higher title in the hierarchy. The moral and political prestige of the Shi'ite ulemas was so high that the religious injunction (fatwah) they issued on any particular aspect of social life was regarded as law by the believers, even if it ran directly counter to the orders of the secular authorities.

An acute conflict between the shah's government and the leadership of the Shi'ite clergy broke out in the early 1960's over the proclamation of the so-called "white revolution," which included, in addition to socioeconomic reforms, a number of secularist measures, including women's suffrage, the transfer of divorce cases to the purview of the secular courts, etc. The "white revolution," which accelerated the development of capitalist relations in Iran's economy, bound this country more closely to the world capitalist system and increased its dependence on the industrially developed West. The "Westernization" of the economic structure was bound to be accompanied by the deformation of the customary way of life. "Western civilization," which came to Iran in the form of skyscrapers, expensive cars, air conditioners and luxury goods, brought with it such inevitable attributes of the "consumer society" as corruption, greed and moral decline. The Western way of life did indeed promise privileged circles the "good life," but the majority of Iranians could scarcely make ends meet and all that they got out of the overseas "model of prosperity" was neon advertisements, garish magazine covers, pornographic movies and a higher crime rate. The inevitable trend in backward societies that have embarked on the road of capitalist modernization--class polarization with "the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer"--was clearly manifested in Iran.

The "Americanization" of everyday life, education, upbringing and social norms suited the neocompradors, but the middle and lower strata saw it as an impermissible encroachment on the inviolability of national traditions, religious ethics and morality. It is therefore understandable that many Iranians interpreted political and social liberation to mean liberation from foreign authoritarianism and a return to age-old spiritual values. "Revolutions and future changes," Iranian historian

M. Jameil wrote, for example, in an attempt to express these feelings, "are more cultural than political because the East has gradually begun to realize, firstly, that it will be unable to secure political or economic independence without real cultural independence and, secondly, that an essentially social ideal is bound to be associated with historical, cultural and social factors."²

The concept of the "Islamic state," put forward by R. Khomeyni, became the alternative model of development and "social ideal." In his opinion, the Shi'ite Islamic state must have a form of government consisting of branches of executive, judicial and legislative power. The legislature has no right to promulgate laws, however, since all laws are already contained in the Koran. "There is absolutely no need for new legislation," Khomeyni wrote in his book "The Islamic Government." "It is simply necessary to enforce the laws that have already been created for you. This will save you considerable time and effort."³

The legislative branch consists of two chambers: The first, in which mujtahedin and experts on Muslim law sit, is responsible for drawing up religious injunctions--"fatwah"; the second, which is actually the "Islamic consultative assembly," includes representatives of the community and of religious minorities. The ruler of the Islamic state must possess at least two qualities--he must know Muslim law and he must be just. Muslim ulemas are vested with the broadest powers: They monitor the work of the executive, administrative and other state organs and even guide the activity of the ruler, ensuring that his decisions do not diverge from the precepts of the Shari'at.

Realizing that the religious "establishment" is incapable of ensuring the normal functioning of all state institutions, despite the breadth of the powers granted to it, Khomeyni did not rule out the possibility of participation in state affairs by technocrats and officials of the civilian administration, provided that the bureaucratic apparatus was as compact as possible and that its activity would be guided by the demands of the Shari'at. "We will leave those who will obey and conscientiously fulfill it (the Islamic "program"--I. T.) on the local level," Khomeyni wrote.⁴

The Iranian revolution, which united various classes, strata and political forces in the country, culminated in the overthrow of the shah's regime in February 1979. After a referendum on 1 April 1979, the country was proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even during its initial stage, the Iranian revolution had important measures to its credit, such as the denunciation of excessively binding agreements with the international oil consortium, the liquidation of American military bases in Iran, the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, racist Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, the recognition of the PLO and the nationalization of private banks and insurance companies, the energy, mining and aviation industries, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, the automotive industry, shipbuilding and a number of food and light industry enterprises.

Although the majority of political forces supported the measures of the Iranian revolution's leaders, which were of a pronounced anti-imperialist and anti-American character, there is no unanimous opinion in Iran with regard to the country's future. The ruling Islamic Republican Party's political line, based on the concepts of the "Islamic state" and the "Islamic economy," is not supported by certain

radical movements that have been vigorously opposing the regime lately, even to the point of armed struggle. Ruling circles have responded to this with large-scale repression. As a result, many opponents of the regime--ranging from extreme leftists to overt monarchists--have been executed.

In view of the contradictions in Iranian domestic political life, it is quite interesting to examine the ideology of the leftwing Muslim Mujahedin-e-Khalq grouping, which has had a marked influence on the activity of radical Islamic movements in certain Muslim countries. 'Ali Shari'ati, a writer and sociologist who was persecuted under the shah's regime and died in mysterious circumstances in London in 1977, is regarded as the spiritual father of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

'Ali Shari'ati's political program was marked by extreme radicalism. Although he called for the overthrow of the shah's regime, he also sharply criticized the Shi'ite clergy because he believed that this clergy had distorted the religious doctrine of early Shi'ism. 'Ali Shari'ati had outstanding oratorical gifts and delivered a series of lectures at the Khosseini Ershad religious center in Tehran in the mid-1960's which made him an extremely popular figure among the younger generation. Using Western scientific terminology and some Marxist and existentialist propositions, he tried to prove that Islam alone was capable of solving modern man's moral and ethical problems. 'Ali Shari'ati seemed to offer young Iranian intellectuals, accustomed to viewing Islam as the creed of "backward Arabs," new "revolutionary" aspects of the religion that filled the ideological vacuum created by the monarchical tyranny.

Despite the clearly eclectic nature of his concepts, 'Ali Shari'ati succeeded in rousing an entire generation of Iranians to action and channeling their feelings of opposition into a selfless struggle against the shah's regime. 'Ali Shari'ati's theological speculations, which substantiate the thesis of man's "responsibility" as an Islamic precept, seem particularly important. "Man," the Iranian ideologist wrote in his work "The Islamic View of Man," "is a complex phenomenon created from clay and the breath of God. He is given the freedom to choose either pole. The possession of a strong will makes him free, but also invests him with responsibility. From the Islamic standpoint, therefore, man is the only creature responsible for his destiny."⁵

Unlike the advocates of the "Islamic state" with its fusion of politics and religion, 'Ali Shari'ati was more inclined to support an "Islamic order" that assumed the subordination of politics and morality to the general spirit of Islam.

Despite the fact that the Islamic revolution in Iran has failed to implement any of the programs put forward by its participants in any consistent or complete form, the influence of the "Iranian factor" on the "Muslim world" has been quite considerable. The explosion of the "Muslim revival," whose epicenter was Iran, has been echoed in various countries in the increased activity of Islamic movements or, at the very least, in the increased public interest in Islamic subject matter.

III

"The concepts of the 'Islamic state' and 'Islamic economy,'" academician Ye. M. Primakov noted, "are being employed by petty bourgeois groups and by conservative

segments of the grand bourgeoisie, which invest them with a quite definite social meaning--the supremacy of bourgeois landowning circles with a clearly expressed preference for dictatorial forms of government."6

Pakistan provides a vivid example of the use of Islamic slogans for this purpose. The process of "Islamization" here was accelerated dramatically when the military government of General Zia-ul-Haq took power, but the struggle for "Islamization" actually began almost from the moment of Pakistan's birth. Secular tendencies in the activity of the country's first rulers evoked a sharp response from Muslim groups. Within 3 months after the emergence of this state, these groups launched a campaign to base its future constitution on the Shari'at. In March 1949 the constituent assembly finally passed a resolution stating that the "Muslims of Pakistan will be able, individually and collectively, to build their life in accordance with the teachings and demands of Islam, recorded in the sacred Koran and the Sunna."7 This statement, with no change in the wording, entered the preamble to the constitution adopted in 1956, with two additions. The first stipulated that the head of state must be a Muslim, and the second declared Pakistan an "Islamic republic."

In the 1960's the concepts of "Islamic" or "Muslim socialism" became part of the official ideology in Pakistan. One of the leading theorists of "Islamic socialism," D. Iqbal, put forth the theory of the so-called "middle way," the cornerstone of which was the idea of a "mixed economy," combining private enterprise with government control and ensuring the prosperity of the "middle class." President Ayub Khan of Pakistan also tried to modernize Islam in line with the theory of the "middle way." "We must," he said, "bring the needs of our religion in line with the needs and possibilities of the present day. No nation can live in the past and survive exclusively on past glory."8

The Indo-Pakistani war, the creation of Bangladesh and the acute social conflicts in Pakistan that led to a rebirth of political activity in the middle strata stimulated the bourgeois modernization of public life. It was at this time that attempts were made to combine the modernist and traditional views on the Islamic path of development. In 1973, when Z. A. Bhutto was the head of the country, a new constitution was published. It said nothing about "Islamic socialism" but retained all of its references to the Koran and Sunna and remarks on the "zak'at" and the need to abolish interest on loans--"riba." Its new elements included a statement about official encouragement of the study of the Arabic language, the institution of the compulsory study of religion in academic institutions and the preparation of a new edition of the Koran with no editing or typographical errors.

Domestic political difficulties forced the Bhutto government to engage in political maneuvers and give in to the pressure of conservative Muslim circles. One of the government's first actions, for example, was the cancellation of the restrictions imposed by previous governments on pilgrimages due to the shortage of foreign currency. In May 1977, just 2 months before he was overthrown, Z. A. Bhutto passed a law prohibiting gambling and declared Friday the day of rest (prior to this, Sunday was considered to be the day of rest).

The middle of the 1970's was marked by a crisis of the reformation currents that were trying to adapt Islam to the requirements of capitalist development. "In most

in the developing countries it was clear by the second half of the 1970's," Soviet researchers L. Polonskaya and A. Ionova note, "that the pro-Western modernist theories had not been effective at all in the political mobilization of broad segments of the population.... In search of mass support, the protectors of bourgeois landowner interests began to play up to petty ownership attitudes and illusions more than ever before. This revealed the many common elements of religious arguments and of some premises of the doctrines worked out by representatives of forces with differing class aims."⁹

The military men who took power in 1977, headed by Zia-ul-Haq, decided to broaden the social base of the regime by seeking support from clerical circles and the religious segment of the population. Pakistan's foreign policy acquired distinct pro-imperialist aims and a tendency to establish close ties with conservative Arab regimes, especially Saudi Arabia.

One of the military regime's undertakings was the creation of a council on Muslim ideology and Shari'at courts. In February 1979 Zia-ul-Haq announced the enactment of several Islamic laws envisaging public executions for persons who drank alcoholic beverages, bore false witness, committed adultery or acted as procurers. In accordance with the Shari'at, thieves would have their hands cut off.

While an economic crisis increased in intensity and the position of the laboring masses grew worse, the military regime announced that the "Islamization" of the economy would be accomplished by instituting the traditional Muslim "zak'at" and "ushr" taxes and gradually prohibiting usury ("riba"). According to the Pakistani leadership's plans, the implementation of Islamic principles in the economic sphere, which presupposed the collection of funds from the rich strata to benefit the needy, should help to resolve social contradictions. An important factor contributing to the decision to transfer legislation and the economy to "Islamic channels" was the military regime's desire for closer cooperation with the oil-exporting Muslim countries that offered Pakistan the loans and credit it needed so desperately. In addition to all this, the propaganda aspect of the Islamic innovations, with the aid of which the regime hoped to divert public attention from the economic crisis and the intensive militarization of the country, was also quite important.

In recent years the extremely rightwing religious "Jamaati-i-Islami" party has been the regime's ideological sounding-board. It was founded in 1941 by renowned Muslim ideologist al-Maududi. In 1947 Jamaati-i-Islami was strictly against the creation of Pakistan, objecting on the grounds that nationalism, which is limited to the framework of one state, breaks up the universal Muslim community (umma), fosters regional attachments and, consequently, alienates believers. Later the party changed its position and led the fight to turn Pakistan into an "Islamic state."

In contrast to the Muslim theologians who concede the possibility of the existence of several types of "Islamic states,"¹⁰ al-Maududi believes that the "Islamic state" should be all-encompassing and universal. He calls his proposed state structure a "theodemocracy." This kind of structure, al-Maududi explains, "is not governed by any special religious class, but by the entire Muslim community.... The Muslim heritage as a whole is governed by the state in accordance with the 'Book of Allah' and the practices of his prophet. If I might be allowed to coin a new term, I would call this system of government a 'theodemocracy' or, in other words, a

divine democratic government, because it would give Muslims limited public sovereignty under the suzerainty of Allah.... In this sense, the Islamic state is a democracy. However, as I have already said, it is also a theocracy, because if any precise teaching of Allah and the prophet already applies to a particular matter, no Muslim leader, legislative body or theologian can express an independent opinion."¹¹

One of the significant peculiarities of al-Maududi's "theodemocracy" is the idea that the ruler and the consultative body are elected by the masses, but not from the masses; they are elected from the elite, which is distinguished by "special" spiritual and intellectual qualities. The elitist principle, which is strictly maintained in the organizational structure of the Jamaat-i-Islami party, apparently impresses the military regime, which has supported it to the maximum.

After the military coup of 1958, as a result of which M. Ayub Khan took power, Jamaati-i-Islami refused to recognize the legality of the regime because any dictatorship is contrary to the concept of an "Islamic state" in which the ruler is elected by the community of believers. Today the leaders of Jamaati-i-Islami have apparently forgotten this principle. With their support, General Zia-ul-Haq is taking repressive actions against leftist democratic forces and has jailed thousands of his opponents without a trial or any other legal proceedings. Hypocritically proclaiming religious slogans, the Jamaati-i-Islami ideologists have effectively given the military regime's undeclared war on Afghanistan their blessing. They are spreading rumors about the "communist threat" and are fully in support of the Islamabad rulers' plans to involve Pakistan in U.S. imperialist interests and turn the country into a stronghold of aggression and anticommunism in South Asia. Today Pakistan is feverishly building up its military potential with huge shipments of American weapons and represents a dangerous source of tension in the region and a real threat to the security of neighboring states, particularly India.

Gangs of Afghan counterrevolutionaries, who have made a comfortable spot for themselves in Pakistan, are also acting to the accompaniment of slogans about "struggle for the faith" and for the restoration of the "purity" of Islamic principles. With the knowledge and consent of the authorities, they have continuously committed provocative acts against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The military regime in Pakistan has authorized Afghan counterrevolutionaries to make use of office buildings and residences in Peshawar, Lahore and other cities. The Afghan counterrevolutionary newspapers DEATH FOR THE FAITH and KHUBEI ISLAM are being sent to the DRA from these cities, and American, Egyptian and Chinese instructors in Pakistani training camps are preparing saboteurs and terrorists for actions in Afghanistan.

Today it is completely obvious that Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, which has verbally expressed concern about the interests of the "Muslim world," has actually turned its country into a bridgehead from which the United States and China are fighting an undeclared war against Afghanistan in an attempt to create favorable conditions in the region for the realization of their own expansionist and hegemonist ambitions. They are relying primarily on the Afghan counterrevolutionaries who disguise their political program with religious slogans.

At a session of the Islamic Conference in Pakistan in January 1980, Afghan reaction was represented by the so-called "United Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan,"

consisting of six parties and groups. Although their tactics differ somewhat, all of them are extreme rightwing nationalist organizations of the grand Afghan bourgeoisie and feudal landowners who want to restore the old order and regain the influence they have lost in Afghanistan. For example, the largest and best organized Afghan counterrevolutionary group, "Khezbe Islami" or the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan," is headed by Gulbuddin Hqmatyar, who owned huge estates in Kundus province before the revolution. The political program of Khezbe Islami, which envisages the overthrow of the progressive regime in Afghanistan, is set off by a number of traditional Islamic demands, such as, for example, the compulsory wearing of the paranji, the separation of the sexes in education, the wearing of a "national uniform" by employees instead of Western dress and the prohibition of liquor, gambling and other signs of "Western influence." The struggle against "Westernization" has not, however, kept G. Hqmatyar from maintaining close contact with the CIA and Israeli intelligence and receiving weapons and financial aid from the United States, Egypt, Pakistan and China.

Sayedh Ahmad Giliani, who heads the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, and Sobhatullah Mojaddedi, the leader of the National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, bear the hereditary title "pir"--or "religious zealot." They, just as G. Hqmatyar, camouflage their own counterrevolutionary programs with religious phrases. Both are the scions of once influential feudal clans with huge agricultural holdings in various parts of Afghanistan. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of "Jamiyate Islamiye" (the "Islamic Society of Afghanistan"), is also a prominent feudal landholder. Before the revolution he owned estates in Kabul and Badakhshan provinces and was a major exporter of karakul to England and the United States. Just as Hqmatyar, Rabbani is closely connected with the CIA, from which he receives financial support and instructions. It is not surprising that all of them are trying their best, with the aid of imperialist propaganda, to convince people that the objectives of the national democratic revolution in Afghanistan are radically contrary to Islam and are striving to stir up anticommunist and anti-Soviet feelings among believers. But the behavior of these "protectors" of Islam is governed by class hatred, and not at all by religious doctrine.

IV

In recent years various religious groups have been noticeably more active in Egypt. The repressive campaign against religious activists in September 1981 and the subsequent assassination of President Sadat by members of the radical Islamic organization "at-Taqqir wa al-Hijrah" ("Redemption and Exodus") reaffirmed the existence of fairly widespread religious opposition to the regime's policies in this country.

Some of the characteristic features of Egyptian public life in the 1970's were the increased demand for religious literature, both legal and underground; ostentatious expressions of Islamic devotion; conversion to Sufism and the enthusiastic attendance of "zikrah" groups. These features were characteristic of the most diverse social strata, from the urban lower classes to the technocratic elite. Demands for the partial "Islamization" of the constitution, legislation and education have become increasingly persistent.

Islam is now being used as an instrument of political struggle in at least two ways: a) as a means of legitimizing secular authority; b) as a way of expressing social protest.

The Egyptian regime could not remain indifferent to the opposition feelings of much of the public. One of President Sadat's important concerns was the legitimization of his policy in the eyes of believers. Taking every opportunity to stress his devotion to Islamic dogma, he announced in May 1971 that Egypt would have a constitution which would take Egyptian tradition into account and would rest on religious principles. In a referendum in September of the same year, the overwhelming majority of Egyptians supported a document which said: "Islam is the religion of the state; Arabic is its official language; the principles of the Islamic Shari'at are the main source of legislation."¹²

But the matter went no further. In 1977 bills banning liquor and stipulating that convicted thieves would have their hands cut off were submitted to the People's Assembly for consideration. But these bills were still-born: The first was "killed" by the tourist lobby--high-placed officials with business and financial interests in the tourist industry; Sadat himself decided not to enact the second because this would have discredited the regime's "liberal" reputation in the West. Later, when Sadat encountered the widespread opposition to the Camp David agreement, he was able to talk the Al Azhar sheiks into a special "fetwah" in support of the "peaceful settlement" with Israel.

In the beginning of the 1970's, however, the underground Muslim Brotherhood organization, which had been banned officially in 1954 after an attempt on President G. A. Nasser's life, was noticeably more active in Egypt. The revival of the Muslim Brotherhood was promoted by Sadat himself, who freed all of the members of the organization who were in jail in 1973 (although the ban was formally still in effect) and officially authorized the publication of two of its press organs--AD-DAWA and AL-ITISAM. Sadat was motivated, on the one hand, by his desire for a "reconciliation" with radical Muslim groups and, on the other, by the hope of using their anti-Nasser and anticommunist aims for his own purposes, to "counterbalance" leftist opposition forces in the country.

The Egyptian regime's cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood seemed feasible at first, but the growth of the organization's social base was accompanied by increased indications of opposition in its propaganda, and in 1977, after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to put an end to this cooperation and subjected the regime to harsh criticism in the press.

"Allah is our god and the prophet is our leader. The Koran is our constitution, the Jihad is our path and death for Allah's sake is our highest ambition"--these are the main slogans of the Muslim Brotherhood. The final goal of its struggle is the creation of an "Islamic state," which is viewed as part of a larger "Islamic order," regulating the way of life of believers on the basis of strict adherence to the precepts of the Shari'at.

The Muslim Brotherhood attaches special importance to violence as a means of changing society. Military doctrine, in their opinion, is a natural extension of religious doctrine, and terrorism is the main instrument of political struggle. The organization relies most on religious agitation among students of higher academic institutions and secondary schools and junior army officers. It has been quite successful in this area. Suffice it to say that after 1977 various Islamic groups became much more active in Egyptian universities and won the majority of seats in

student councils after defeating the supporters of the late President G. A. Nasser, who were still quite influential in the mid-1970's.

The Muslim Brotherhood's reaction to Sadat's "peaceful initiative" was extremely critical. At the end of 1978 one of the organization's ideologists, at-Telmesani, published an article in AD-DAAWA, in which he stated the brotherhood's views on the regime's new foreign policy line. All of the bargaining with regard to occupied Arab territories, especially Jerusalem--one of the Muslims' traditional holy places--was hardest to accept for the Muslim Brotherhood, many of the members of which had fought in the war of 1948-1949.

"The Muslim's virtues and his belief in his own rights," at-Telmesani says, "obligates him to bravely bear all deprivations and sacrifices until he has enough strength to restore all of his rights.... We must not be afraid of war, regardless of its results.... Our most important reason for taking this position is the complete disregard of the question of Jerusalem and the absence of any references to it, which confirms Begin's remark about Jerusalem as the capital of Israel."¹³

The growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood naturally disturbed the Sadat regime. Nevertheless, Sadat did not want to lose prestige among the religious segments of the population and refrained from taking any kind of radical action until his political opponents resorted to unconcealed violence.

In April 1974 an extremist Islamic organization, which called itself the "Muslim Liberation Group," attempted a coup d'etat. The members of this organization occupied the military engineering college in Cairo's Heliopolis district and prepared to move on to the headquarters of the Arab Socialist Union, where the president was expected to speak. The conspiracy was revealed when one member of the group denounced it, and all of the conspirators were brought to trial.

The regime was unable to stem the wave of violence, however. The 28 August 1977 issue of Egypt's OCTOBER magazine reported that the police had arrested 104 members of the extremist religious organization "Jund Allah." Two days later, on 30 August, AL-AKHRAM reported that 80 members of the Jihad underground Islamic group in Alexandria had been arrested. The most sensational event of summer 1977, however, was probably the kidnapping and subsequent assassination of a prominent figure in the Egyptian religious "establishment," waqaf Minister al-Dakhabi, who was believed to support radical methods of struggle against extremist Islamic groups, which he called "heretical." The then unknown at-Taqqir wa al-Hijrah organization took credit for the assassination. As a result of mass police raids and searches in Cairo's residential neighborhoods, 204 members of this underground organization were arrested and brought to trial in a military court. Five of its leaders were sentenced to death and executed on 19 March 1978. Another 36 members were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms of varying length.¹⁴

An analysis of the political platform of these Islamic groups testifies to their close ideological connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, with the only difference being in the means of attaining goals. The Muslim extremists' ultimate goal is the establishment of a new social order, based on the principles of orthodox Islam. The members of these groups assess present realities in much the same way. They believe that the police force is now consumed by corruption and blame this on the

substitution of imported Western, man-made legislation for the Shari'at. The ruling elite does not care about the observance of Islamic principles and the natural result of this is moral decline, mass illiteracy, disease and vice.

There are some differences of opinion between these groups. The Muslim Liberation Group, in particular, believes that all of the defects are in the police system, and not in the society, which is merely a victim of this system. The ideology of the al-Faqlir wa al-Hijrah group does not make these distinctions, proceeding from the assumption that the political structure and the society are two sides of the same coin. A corrupt society, in their opinion, engenders a defective political system, and vice versa.

The economic program of the radical Muslim groups is quite vague and confused. Most of them resolutely reject both capitalism and socialism but do not propose any kind of balanced economic structure as an alternative. The common promise is that the Islamic state must exclude the possibility of extreme poverty and extreme wealth. This can only be achieved if believers adhere to the precepts of Islam and religious prohibitions (muhammat). The precepts include the compulsory payment of the "zak'at" tax, conscientious and diligent labor for fair pay, and good deeds. The prohibitions include bans on fraud, waste, greed and usury.

The political demands of the radical Islamic groups, just as their economic "program," display some of the characteristic features of a petty bourgeois utopia. These fit in well with the general views of the ideologists of Muslim radicalism, the majority of whom come from the lowest strata of the rural and provincial bourgeoisie.

It is interesting to trace the ideological roots of radical Islamic groups. Above all, these groups do not separate themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood. Almost all of their leaders come from the brotherhood or religious societies and parties with similar aims. The political program of the Muslim Liberation Group was drawn up under the influence of the ideas of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Said Qutb, its leading theorist. Their views were influenced by the theological works of al-Maududi, the ideologist of Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami party, and 'Ali Shari'ati, the spiritual father of the Iranian Mujahedins.

The Muslim Brotherhood has branches in many Muslim cities, where they have close associations with feudal theocratic reaction, oppose progressive reforms and objectively play into the hands of imperialist circles. The activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is indicative in this respect. In Syria, militant groups of the organization tried to launch a bloody terrorist campaign against the national democratic leaders who were pursuing a consistent anti-imperialist policy in the interest of Arab unity and solidarity in a struggle to liberate occupied Arab lands.

Today's Muslim movement therefore cannot be regarded as anything integral and homogeneous. Progressive anti-imperialist and antifeudal tendencies are often combined with extreme reaction, anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. Under these conditions, it is particularly important to take a class approach to the analysis of political events in the "Muslim world," to interpret all causes and effects correctly and to analyze specific events in each country objectively. Only this approach can reveal the actions behind the words and the social and class aims behind the slogans.

FOOTNOTES

1. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 2, 1980, pp 77-78.
2. Masjid Jameii, "The Revolution Which Islam Created," Tehran, 1980, p 4.
3. Ruhollah Khomeyni, "Al-Hukumah al-Islamiyah," Beirut, p 134 (in Arabic).
4. Ibid., p 135.
5. 'Ali Shari'ati, "Islamic View of Man," Tehran, p 7.
6. Ye. M. Primakov, "Islam and Social Development in the Countries of the Foreign East" (VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 8, 1980, p 65).
7. "Religiya i obshchestvennaya mysl' narodov Vostoka" [The Religion and Social Thought of the Peoples of the East], Moscow, 1971, p 126.
8. "Religiya i obshchestvennaya mysl' stran Vostoka" [The Religion and Social Thought of the Countries of the East], Moscow, 1974, p 11.
9. L. Polonskaya and A. Ionova, "The Concept of the 'Islamic Economy': Social Essence and Political Purpose" (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 3, 1981, pp 54-55).
10. Sudanese religious activist Sadiq al-Mahdi, in particular, believes that, due to differences in the developmental levels of various Muslim countries, each country might have its own constitution but still be an "Islamic state" (see "The Challenge of Islam," edited by Altaf Gauhar, London, 1978, p 131).
11. "Islam: Its Meaning and Message," edited by Khurshid Ahmad, Islamic Council of Europe, London, 1975, pp 160-161.
12. Quoted in: G. H. Jansen, "Militant Islam," London, 1979, p 140.
13. AL-MUSTAQBAL, 21 October 1978, pp 9-10 (in Arabic).
14. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, December 1980, p 452.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1982

3588

CSO: 1816/8

SOVIET JOURNAL REVIEWS BOOK ON LENIN LEGACY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 82
(signed to press 21 Apr 82) pp 143-146

[Review by N. Kolikov of book "Lenin kak politicheskii myslitel'" [Lenin as a Political Thinker], edited by V. V. Zagladin, I. K. Pantin, T. T. Timofeyev and G. Kh. Shakhmazarov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981: "The Pertinence of Lenin's Legacy"]

[Text] In worldwide Leniniana, researchers--both Marxists and their opponents--pay perhaps the closest attention to the subject of "Lenin as a revolutionary, politician and political thinker." What are V. I. Lenin's features as a political leader? What is the nature of the intellectual arsenal which enabled him, at each new turn in the revolution and with each successive change of scenery on the revolutionary stage, to seek out the only correct answer to the fundamental problems facing the Russian proletariat, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet regime? What is Leninism's contribution to the development of 20th century political thought?

Many Marxist scholars try to find adequate replies to these and related questions. Among recent works the book under review is of undoubted interest, based as it is on the speeches of Soviet participants in the special session of the 11th World Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Moscow.

The book brings together articles by 30 authors. Naturally--and the preface notes this--the works of different researchers bear the imprint of their authors' individuality. Let us add that they are not all of equal value. Some graphically illustrate particular aspects of Lenin's legacy and introduce the reader to the proletarian leader's laboratory of political thought, while others are more in the nature of surveys.

The anthology cogently reveals the pertinence of Lenin's legacy. A special article by P. Fedoseyev deals with this subject. The importance of Lenin's propositions for the present day is mentioned in virtually every article. This question is very important and fundamental: As is well known, in our day there are people who call themselves communists but who deny the pertinence of Leninism by referring to the antiquity of Lenin's works and to the difference between historical eras, the specific features of political situations and so forth.

Of course, it would be naive to uphold the formula which says: "Lenin said such and such and, consequently, in our era we should act in such and such a way." This way

of framing the question, when theory is based on the unquestionable nature of an authority, on the absolutization of past experience and its application to an altered reality, is a very gross distortion of Marxism and a grave threat to its development, replacing the theory of history with the history of theory. V. I. Lenin himself constantly struggled against this caricaturization of Marxism which frequently emanated from the ranks of the revolutionary party and was done with the best of intentions.

When communists speak of the topicality of Leninism and its significance for the revolutionary struggle even under present conditions, they have something else in mind, of course. "Today's conditions in both West and East are in many ways unlike Russian conditions. But Lenin's teachings contain such a wealth of ideas and proposals concerning the forms and methods of the struggle for socialism that they can provide a guideline under any conditions, in any country," V. V. Zagladin stresses in his article "The Summit of Revolutionary Thought." "Of course, only a guideline. All the rest--the specific means and details of the great work of 'introducing socialism'--must be elaborated independently by each revolutionary party and each people" (p 45).

V. I. Lenin considered power to be a basic and determining factor in the development of the revolution and its foreign and domestic policy. The anthology views class-based, group-based and personal power as "the real ability to implement one's will in public life and to impose it, if necessary, on other people" (see F. Burlatskiy's article "Leninism and the Development of Political Theory"). Policy is defined as "a form of mutual relations between classes, social groups, nations and states linked directly or indirectly with manifestations of power and ruling activity" (p 319).

The central theme of the entire work is an analysis of the role of the subjective factor in the historical process and its relationship with the objective natural laws of society's development. It is no accident that the following words of V. I. Lenin have been selected as the book's epigraph: "Marxism differs from all other socialist theories by its remarkable union of complete scientific sobriety in analyzing the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with the most resolute recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy, revolutionary creativity and revolutionary initiative of the masses and, of course, of individuals, groups, organizations and parties knowing how to find, and act on, a connection with particular classes."¹

Among the works in the anthology which help us to understand this feature of Marxism we can single out I. Pantin's article "The Method of Political Thinking." Examining Lenin's enormous contribution to the theory of Marxism--a contribution without which Marxist thinking today would be totally inconceivable--the author shows how Lenin's works reveal "the mechanism of the real impact of human will on the historical process" (p 326).

In political analysis, when the behavior of specific social strata is considered, it is no longer enough to assess the latter's ideology by contrasting illusions to reality and consciousness to existence. "It is not enough because, from being a simple reflection of reality, consciousness of the classes and masses and, conversely, because the objective tasks facing a particular class can no longer be viewed in isolation from the way in which they are understood" (pp 331-332).

In other words, as I. Pantin writes, the consideration of the fact that the contrast between "thinking" and "being" and between "ideology" and "practice" was losing its absolute nature in politics and had become mobile was a substantially new feature in the Leninist political analysis of reality. As a result, a new, quite specific "measure" of the historical process emerged. The repetitions and the regularity of the events on which the natural law of social development is based can no longer be viewed in isolation from the state of the social subject.

The natural law thus acts as "a conflict and resultant force of objective tendencies," including--and this must be stressed--the diverse potential of historical movement (p 333). This means that the future acts "not as a programmed scheme but as the sum total of real alternatives, real in the sense that each accords with an objectively feasible course of economic evolution" (p 334). Hence the orientation of Lenin's theory toward definite action and, at the same time, the consideration of the possibility of another, less optimal variation of historical development.

Lenin's understanding of the heterogeneity of the course of events and of the possibility, particularly in periods of crisis, of alternative solutions is examined by a number of authors in the book being reviewed. They correctly associate this with a very important distinctive feature of Leninism: the active attitude toward reality, in contrast to the philosophy of passivity and contemplation which inspired many members of the Second International. Some bourgeois ideologists seek voluntarism in V. I. Lenin where there is actually an explanation of the true historical natural law and establishment of the active role of the revolutionary classes' consciousness and will.

Reality and the process of its evolution also include the element of the definite unpredictability of events. Here the specific logic of historical creation proves far richer and "more cunning" than any forecasts built on theory. This is why politics, according to Lenin, is a very complex science and a very subtle art: Only this kind of dual approach to politics enables a revolutionary party to apply correctly the general and basic principles of communism "to the /uniqueness/ [in bold-face] in the objective development toward communism which is inherent in each individual country and which we must know how to study, find and divine."²

As a theorist and scholar, when V. I. Lenin renewed Marxism's tie with revolutionary practice, he inevitably came up against the problem of his attitude toward "old" Marxist solutions which no longer accorded with altered conditions. On the political level, he viewed this problem (it is analyzed, in particular, in the article by V. Vlasova and Ye. Plimak, entitled "Politics as a Science and Art") as an attitude toward tactical slogans, which are essentially one-track and ephemeral but which, once adopted, possess a certain inertia and take a long time to overcome. "Any slogan which the party launches among the masses," V. I. Lenin stressed, "has the property of becoming stagnant, of dying or of retaining its force for many people even when the conditions which created the need for this slogan have changed. This is an inevitable evil and, until we learn to combat and avoid it, we cannot secure correct party policy."³

Therefore, the politician must not only determine precisely the boundaries of the applicability of each slogan and the specific form of struggle but must also help to reeducate the masses, for whom the need to convert to a new slogan is less clear

than for a professional politician. Understandably, in revolutionary periods this change takes place more frequently and political turns are sharper than in periods of relatively peaceful development. V. I. Lenin pointed out to those who did not understand this and reproached the Bolsheviks for deviating from the "straight" path in their tactics that diversions are caused by the reality of the class struggle and the behavior of the political adversary.

One characteristic feature of V. I. Lenin as an unrivaled party leader and proletarian revolutionary was his ability to assess soberly what had been achieved, his reluctance to acknowledge defeats and his ability to learn and draw conclusions as to what had to be changed in the party's activity. "It is necessary to speak bluntly," V. I. Lenin taught. "This is interesting and important not only from the standpoint of theoretical truth but also from the practical aspect. We cannot learn to resolve our task by new means today unless yesterday's experience has opened our eyes to the inapplicability of old methods."⁴

Lenin's greatness as a political thinker and leader was revealed in full in the period of the preparation and implementation of the October Revolution and later when he was the leader of the Soviet State. His political activity in those years is discussed at length in the book being reviewed. Articles of particular interest are A. Butenko's "The Building of Socialism: From Theory to Practice," Yu. Krasin's "Lenin's Theory of Socialist Revolution and the Present Day," Yu. Karyakin's and Ye. Plimak's "On the Forms of Struggle for Socialism," V. Petrovskiy's "The Working Class and Lenin's Policy of Socialist Construction," S. Kaltakhchyan's "The Teaching on Nations and the Principles for Resolving the Nationalities Question," N. Azarov's and L. Arskaya's "Economics and Politics" and a number of other articles.

The greatest theoretical tasks resolved anew by V. I. Lenin in precisely that period included the elaboration of the theory of imperialism, the substantiation of the possibility of revolutionary victory in one country and the development of the teaching on the state and of the Marxist concept of socialism and the ways of creating a classless society. If these and other related problems of social development had not been resolved--and resolved not only in the abstract, in theory, but also in life, in practice--the historical transition to a new formation, effected by the Russian working people under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, would have been impossible.

In the process of revolutionary transformations and during keen discussions within the party, the question of the correlation between economics and politics frequently arose on both the theoretical and the practical political planes. In resolving it, V. I. Lenin, as is well known, invariably insisted on the priority of the latter. Commenting on this very important premise, V. Petrovskiy writes: "The supremacy of politics over economics in the sense that Lenin understood it means not the supplanting of economics by politics but the supremacy of the working class' general economic interests over the most immediate individual interests, securing for society the maximum (to be more precise we should obviously say the maximum possible, or the optimal--N. K.) tempo of economic development" (p 216).

By analyzing various aspects of the experience of socialist construction in the USSR, especially in the first years of Soviet power, the authors show that the creation of a new society "is not a straight or smooth road" but a tortuous path

with many sharp curves, characterized by movement that is smooth or headlong, forward or backward (p 217). On this path the working class needs not only revolutionary determination and a willingness to make sacrifices, but also the ability to make virtually instantaneous changes in orientation and in the forms and methods of socialist construction.

The book cogently reveals the worldwide significance of the experience of the Russian revolution, the experience of socialist construction in Russia and V. I. Lenin's tremendous contribution to the development of Marxism. "Socialism as a social system will be established everywhere only as a result of the creative application of the Marxist concept of socialism developed by V. I. Lenin," A. Butenko stresses. "No matter how low or how high the developmental level of this or that capitalist country, no matter what distinguishes its specific paths toward socialism, socialism itself, as a social system unified in its essence and diverse in its forms, will be organized on the foundation of Leninist ideas, which show all countries something very fundamental about their inevitable and not too distant future" (p 85).

Prominent among the articles dealing with individual aspects of political thought and action is A. Lebedev's work "The Problem of Political Compromise." The author stresses the importance and pertinence of this theme in the struggle for the unity of the proletariat itself, in the choice of paths of transition to socialism and in the consolidation of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. The revelation of Lenin's attitude toward compromises gives us a deeper understanding of the uniqueness of the political thinking of the leader of the revolution. V. I. Lenin describes the party's renunciation of part of its demands in accordance with an agreement with other parties as a compromise in policy, sees it as an utterly particular, peaceful form of struggle and links the need for it with the oblique, zigzag development of the historical process itself.

A. Bovin's article traces the way in which Lenin's idea of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems gradually matured and how it developed out of the practical needs of the Russian revolution and received fundamental theoretical substantiation. "While initially," the author writes, "the side-by-side existence of states of different types was considered to be a temporary result of the delayed advent of revolutions in Europe, gradually--as the international position of Soviet power became stronger--the conviction grew in Lenin that the prolonged nature of this coexistence was inevitable. Hence the course toward maintaining lasting, steady relations with the capitalist world, especially economic relations" (pp 401-402).

The author particularly highlights what G. V. Chicherin calls V. I. Lenin's "inimitable political realism" and "peerless flexibility." Touching on the sphere of international relations, he frequently warned against implacability, intransigence and the issuance of ultimatums which sharply narrow the scope for political maneuvering. And this approach, the article stresses, was certainly not dictated by the weakness of the young land of the Soviets. Lenin saw it as an opportunity to exert real influence on the policy of other states. "When the Soviet regime's foreign policy objectives are being considered," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "the greatest caution, circumspection and restraint are needed so that extreme elements in military parties will not be aided by a thoughtless or rash move."⁵

He does not refer simply to military parties, but to their "extreme elements." This is highly characteristic of Lenin the politician--the ability to single out the different strata, groups and factions of the bourgeoisie, differing from one another in their political orientation and varying attitudes toward contacts with Soviet Russia.

In the articles dealing with problems of foreign policy and international relations, the authors successfully reveal the organic link, stemming from the Leninist approach, between the policy of the CPSU and other fraternal parties at the present stage and their struggle to preserve and consolidate detente, effect disarmament and strengthen international peace. The book shows clearly that the development of weapons of mass destruction makes it impossible to regard nuclear war as a reasonable instrument of state policy and that the preservation of peace and peaceful coexistence are in the common interest of both the socialist and the capitalist states.

On the other hand, the bourgeois consciousness, A. Bovin stresses, tends to place the idea of preserving the social status quo at the center of its interpretation of detente and peaceful coexistence. This view is incorrect. "War as a method of 'clarifying relations' among states can and must be banned. In this sense, peaceful coexistence includes the requirements of the status quo. But you cannot 'ban' civil or national liberation wars, nor can you 'ban' revolution as a means of changing political and social systems" (p 413).

Of course, peaceful coexistence does not eliminate the differences between socialist and capitalist class interests. Its social meaning lies elsewhere--in preventing the inevitable clash of those interests from approaching the point beyond which "non-existence" begins.

The subject matter of this book covers a broad range. Virtually no aspect of Lenin's political activity or of his work on policy matters has been omitted from the author's purview. But it is more important to stress something else: The materials of the anthology as a whole successfully carry on the tradition of research into Lenin's deeds and ideas from today's vantage point. This tradition correctly assigns priority to an awareness of the theoretical and methodological value of Lenin's statements. It is a tradition which helps us understand the "living soul" of Leninism which, in the great leader's works--in this instance, on political issues--is of historical and current significance and makes these works immortal.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], vol 16, p 23.
2. Ibid., vol 41, p 74.
3. Ibid., vol 37, p 194.
4. Ibid., vol 44, p 205.
5. Ibid., vol 36, p 324.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1982

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

Sept. 9, 1982